导读：清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波，9月27日在香港《南华早报》发表题为“An India seeking gains from US-China rivalry is no guru to the world”的英文评论。周波认为，印度的重要性固然与日俱增，但其奉行的机会主义外交政策，以及从大国竞争中渔利的心态和作为，使其更像伊索寓言中的蝙蝠，因为首鼠两端，绝不可能成为自诩的“世界老师”。观察者网翻译全文。

《南华早报》文章截图

【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波，翻译/李泽西，核译/韩桦】

印度的重要性正与日俱增，但到底能有多重要？在20国集团新德里峰会召开前夕，印度各大城市的主要报纸、广告牌和公交车站都宣称印度是“Vishwaguru”, 即“世界的老师”。

这个口号让人困惑。印度能教给世界什么？印度一直以“世界上最大的民主国家”自居，但是莫迪总理领导的印度政府正被越来越多人批评为“独裁”和“专制”。9月18日，加拿大总理特鲁多在加拿大议会上宣布，有“可信的指控”说明一名加拿大裔著名锡克教徒被杀与“印度政府特工”有关。

尽管印度已成为世界第五大经济体，其发展速度也不容小觑，但即使印度经济能保持5%年增长率，到2050年，印度的人均国内生产总值也只能达到美国的30%左右，大致相当于今天中国的水平。与此同时，中国已在过去40年间帮助数亿人摆脱了贫困。毋庸置疑，中国在实现经济发展的道路方面有更多经验可以与其他发展中国家分享。

今年1月，莫迪邀请125个发展中国家举办了一个线上“全球南方之声”峰会，但没有邀请中国、巴西和南非。这大概是因为，如果这三个重量级发展中国家也在场的话，印度可能不好意思标榜自己为“全球南方之声”。

印度的真正优势在于，作为一个中等强国，它可以在大国竞争中坐收渔利。在俄乌冲突问题上，中国和印度都采取了审慎的中立态度，但美国选择忽略对印度的不满，因为美国的长期战略需要拉拢印度，抗衡中国。印度就是借此成功说服美国和欧洲同意，淡化G20声明中的俄乌冲突部分。显然，如果中国是G20东道主，这种共识将更难达成。

印度9月举办2023年G20领导人峰会（图源：南华早报）

尽管意大利总理梅洛尼曾提出印度可以在促进俄乌冲突结束方面发挥“中心作用”，但这是不可能的。目前已经有几项和平计划摆在桌面上，包括中国提出的立场文件。但除非是莫斯科和华盛顿，而不是莫斯科和基辅，能达成协议，否则这些计划都不会奏效。如果说俄罗斯会听取谁的意见，那一定是中国而不是印度。

印度依赖俄罗斯提供武器装备和能源。但是卡内基俄罗斯欧亚中心主任加布耶夫（Alexander Gabuev）认为，即便是在普京离任后，俄罗斯也将继续依赖中国。中国将长期成为俄罗斯的商品出口市场、核心技术进口来源以及最重要的外交伙伴。

从长远来看，印度与俄罗斯的关系正处于下降趋势，尽管不会中断。未来几十年，印度仍将需要从俄罗斯进口石油和天然气，但会减少进口俄罗斯武器占比。由于俄乌冲突，俄罗斯向印度交付塔尔瓦级隐形护卫舰的计划已经延迟了。

美国显然非常乐意让印度摆脱对俄罗斯的依赖。加强美印军工合作能否真正增强印度的武器制造能力，还是会使印度军工系统变成一锅更大的大杂烩，我们拭目以待。

印度面临的最大挑战，是如何与远在天边的美国合作获得最大收益，同时又不激怒其更强大的邻居中国。当下，印度正在受到美国的青睐，一如冷战期间，美国曾主动亲近中国以对抗苏联。对新德里来说，这无疑是一个应该抓住的好时机。如果装蒜是一门艺术，那么莫迪堪称首屈一指的大师。

例如，尽管印度在海洋法问题上的立场相对更接近中国，莫迪仍附和美国“自由开放的印太”这一说法。美国海军曾在中国和印度的专属经济区内开展“航行自由”行动。不同的是，中国海军一定会做出反应，而印度海军则装作什么都没发生。

2021年4月7日，美国约翰·保罗·琼斯号驱逐舰在印度专属经济区内开展“航行自由”行动（资料图图源：美国海军）

中印关系缓和符合两国的利益。以印度重要出口产业的制药业为例，其中70%的活性成分来自中国，同样，印度也是中国的一个巨大市场。这就是为什么中国公司尽管对印度的营商环境不满，但仍考虑在当地投资。

除非中印边境爆发战争，否则印度不会甘心成为美国的棋子。中印发生冲突的可能性很低。虽然2020年6月双方确实在加勒万山谷发生了致命的斗殴，但这是40多年来中印边境唯一发生人员伤亡的事件。

事实上，两国士兵在上述斗殴中只使用了石头和棍棒。这告诉我们，双方都知道在任何情况下都不应该向对方开枪。如果真的能吸取教训，双方完全有可能至少再维持边境地区四十年和平。

印度外交政策往好了说是实用主义，往坏了说就是机会主义。但印度左右逢源、八面玲珑的做法不可能使它成为“世界的老师”。相反，印度看上去更像是伊索寓言中的蝙蝠，对即将发生的鸟兽之战首鼠两端，一会儿说自己是飞鸟，一会儿说自己是走兽。印度这样的做法也并不罕见。随着大国竞争愈演愈烈，世界上出现的蝙蝠远比飞鸟或走兽更多。

以下为英文原文：

India is growing in importance. But how much more important will it become? In the lead-up to the Group of 20 summit in New Delhi, major newspapers, billboards and bus stops in every Indian city proclaimed India as a “Vishwaguru”, or teacher to the world.

This is baffling. What would India teach the world? It has never been shy to describe itself as the world’s largest democracy. But the Indian government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is increasingly being criticised as authoritarian and repressive. On September 18, Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau told the country’s parliament of “credible allegations” that linked the killing of a prominent Canadian Sikh to “agents of the government of India”.

While the advance of what is now the world’s fifth-largest economy has been impressive, even if India could sustain annual growth of 5 per cent, its gross domestic product per head would reach about 30 per cent of the United States’ levels, roughly where China’s is today, in 2050. Meanwhile, Beijing has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty in four decades. Needless to say, China has more to share with other developing countries on ways of achieving economic development.

In January, Modi hosted a virtual Voice of Global South Summit for 125 developing countries, but didn’t invite China, Brazil or South Africa. Presumably, in the presence of these leading developing nations, India would have felt embarrassed to describe itself as the voice of the Global South.

India’s real advantage is that, as a middle power, it can capitalise on major-power competition. With regard to the war in Ukraine, while both China and India have adopted a studied neutrality, Washington has set aside its frustration at New Delhi because of its long-term strategic need to draw India closer and counter China. This is how India succeeded in persuading the US and Europe to agree to a softened G20 statement on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Clearly, such a consensus would have been harder to reach with China as G20 host.

However, India is unable to play a “central role” in facilitating an end to the hostilities in Ukraine, despite what Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni suggested. There are already several peace plans on the table, including one from China. None of them will work unless Moscow and Washington, rather than Moscow and Kyiv, can agree a deal. If Russia will listen to anyone, it is more China than India.

India depends on Russia for weaponry and energy. But, according to Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, Russia’s reliance on China will outlast Vladimir Putin, in that Russia is increasingly dependent on China as a market for its commodities, as a source of critical imports, and as its most important diplomatic partner.

In the long term, the Indian-Russian relationship is on a downward trend, although it won’t break. For decades to come, India will still need Russian oil and gas, but it will reduce its dependence on Russian arms. Due to the war in Ukraine, Russia has already fallen behind schedule in delivering Talwar-class stealth frigates to India.

Washington would be only too happy to wean New Delhi off Russian dependency. It remains to be seen whether increasing US-India defence industrial cooperation can really bolster New Delhi’s defence manufacturing capabilities, or if India’s defence sector will end up a bigger hodgepodge of everything from everywhere.

New Delhi’s biggest challenge is maximising gains from its relations with a faraway Washington without irking Beijing, its stronger neighbour. India is now being wooed by the US as China was once cozied up to by the US against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is certainly an opportune moment for New Delhi to seize. If pretending is an art, then Modi is a guru second to none.

For example, he has echoed the US’ call for a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, even though India’s position on maritime law is closer to China’s than the US’. Both China and India have been challenged by the US Navy with its freedom of navigation operations in their exclusive economic zones. The difference is that the Chinese Navy will definitely react, while the Indian Navy will pretend nothing has happened.

Detente between China and India would serve both countries’ interests. For instance, India’s pharmaceutical industry, a big exporter, gets 70 per cent of active ingredients from China. Likewise, India is a vast market for China. This explains why, in spite of complaints about India’s domestic environment, Chinese companies are still considering investing in India.

Unless there is a border war between China and India, New Delhi won’t be a willing pawn for Washington. The likelihood of a conflict between China and India is low. While it is true that the two sides had a deadly brawl in the Galwan valley in June 2020, it was the first case with casualties in over 40 years.

The fact that the soldiers from both sides were fighting with stones and clubs tells us that they knew they shouldn’t shoot at each other in any circumstances. If a lesson has truly been learned, it is entirely possible for both sides to maintain peace in the border area, at least for four more decades.

India’s foreign policy is at best pragmatic and at worst opportunistic, but trying to be all things to all people won’t make India a “Vishwaguru”. Instead, India comes across more as the bat from Aesop’s fable, which describes itself as a bird or a beast depending on its assessment of an impending war between birds and beasts. But India is not alone in this. In a world of intensifying major-power competition, there are more bats than birds or beasts.

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